2022-08-12, 11:45–12:45 (US/Pacific), Talks (Virtual)
Malicious actors are always trying to find new ways to avoid detection by evermore vigilant EDR systems and deploy their payloads. Over the years, the scope of techniques used has branched from relatively simplistic hash comparison and sandbox avoidance to low level log dodging and even direct circumvention of EDR telemetry acquisition. By examining some of the techniques used on Windows systems this talk will highlight will highlight the range of capabilities defensive operators are dealing with, how some can be detected and, in rare cases, the performance and false-positive obstacles in designing detection capability.
My presentation will cover malicious memory techniques which will focus on the Windows operating system. These will span from relatively simple in-line hooking techniques used to jump to malicious code or circumvent legitimate code execution, all the way to manipulation of exception handling mechanisms. The talk will also cover information on problematic situations which occur when designing detection mechanisms for such activities in the real world where cost-balancing is required for resource management.
I will explain in-line hooking, Kernel patching (InfinityHook, Ghost_in_the_logs), Heaven-Gate hooking and Vectored Exception Handler (VEH) manipulation techniques (FireWalker) and how they can be detected. In-line hooking and Heavens-Gate hooking involves the practice of manipulating the loaded memory of a module within a specific processes memory space. Kernel Patching involves injecting a hook into the Kernel memory space in order to provide a low level, high priority bypassing technique for malicious programs to circumvent ETW log publication via vulnerable kernel driver installation. VEH manipulation is the use of the high priority frameless exception mechanism in order to circumvent memory integrity checks, manipulate flow control and even run malicious shellcode. Detection for all these techniques will involve advancing from the explanation of its execution to the telemetry sources that can be leveraged for detection purposes. In all cases this involves the examination of volatile memory, however as each technique targets a different native functionality, the mechanisms required to analyze the memory differ greatly. The deviations can be relatively simple, but in some cases an understanding of undocumented mechanisms and structures is required to affect detection capability
Examination of un-tabled module function modifications will also provide insight into some of the difficulties involved in this detection development work. This section will provide the audience with a low level technical understanding of how these techniques are targeted, developed and used by malicious actors and some possible solutions for detection, with an explanation of the inherent caveats in such solutions (primarily around resource availability or accuracy trade-offs).
A full explanation on devised detection methodology and collectable telemetry will be provided for each malicious technique. This will cover the overall detection capabilities as well as exploring the low level mechanisms used to collect this data from the monitored system such as OP code heuristics and memory location attribution crossing CPU mode boundaries. Included in this explanation will be an explanation on issues encountered with collection, typically related to OS architecture choices, and how these can also be circumvented to enable effective monitoring.
Audience members should leave my presentation having a firm grasp on the fundamentals of all the techniques outlined and why attackers may choose to employ them in different scenarios. Along with a functional understanding of the malicious technique, the audience members will also be supplied with a working understanding of detection options for these techniques and clear examples of how monitoring can be deployed and integrated into their solutions.
Connor Morley is a senior security researcher at WithSecure. A keen investigator of malicious TTP’s, he enjoys experimenting and dissecting malicious tools to determine functionality and developing detection methodology. As a researcher and part time threat hunter he is experienced with traditional and ‘in the wild’ malicious actors’ behaviour.